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MUSINGS ON THE JURY SYSTEM:
REVERENCE AND RESPECT*
Hon. Andre M. Davist
I would like to provide a few observations about the
excellent preceding presentations.' First, on the question of
impartiality, I think that Justice Marshall got it right. In his
concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,' he stated that
peremptory challenges need to be scuttled, and I am confident
that in due course they will be. But the truth of the matter is
that before we get to that point in our development, it is fairly
clear that judges-state and federal-will have to rethink their
approach to voir dire, or as they say west of the Mississippi,
"voir dyre."
Clearly, in a regime without peremptories, the voir
dire process has to be far more searching, probing, and
thorough than is typical today. I have a very recent example of
this problem. A very controversial murder trial took place
recently in Baltimore state court.' I teach criminal procedure in
* ©2001 Honorable Andre M. Davis. All Rights Reserved.
t United States District Judge, District of Maryland.
' This essay is a revised version of remarks presented at a plenary panel on
"The Law's Quest for Impartiality: Juror Selection and Juror Nullification" at The Jury
in the Twenty-First Century: An Interdisciplinary Conference held at Brooklyn Law
School on Oct. 6, 2000.
My experience with juries also includes being a juror on two criminal trials
in state court.
2 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986).
3 For more information on this unpublished case see Maureen O'Hagan, An
Untraditional Death: Trial Bares Promise, Pitfalls of Arranged Marriage, WASH. POST,
Aug. 29, 2000 at Bi; Maureen O'Hagan, Md. Murder Retrail Opens With Theatrics,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2000, at B2; Maureen O'Hagan, A Night of Blood and Death
Recalled for Md. Jury, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2000, at B4; Maureen O'Hagan,
Canadian Dentist Guilty, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2000, at Bi; Maureen O'Hagan,
Dentist Gets 3 Years in Husband's Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at B3.
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the evening as an adjunct professor at the law school in
Baltimore, and one of my students told me that he had been
selected to serve on the jury in a retrial of this controversial
murder case. I was aghast, and I asked him how on earth he
managed as a second year law student to get on this jury. No
doubt he did not list on his jury questionnaire the fact that he
was a student because he is a full time employee and only goes
to law school at night.
He told me, and I knew it to be true, that the voir dire
did not include what for most of us, certainly in the federal
system, is a standard question: Are you or are any of your close
family members trained or employed as a lawyer or in the legal
field? That is a question that almost any judge would ask
during voir dire in a criminal case, and most civil cases, as a
matter of course. But today, my former colleagues on the
circuit court for Baltimore City4 likely feel tremendous
pressures to move enormous numbers of cases with limited
resources, and, as a result, they take shortcuts that raise
questions about the fairness of the process and the impartiality
of the panel that is put in place. I think the day is coming when
peremptories will be a legal historical fact rather than a
current fact, but I think we are a good ways away from that
now.
Second, on the question of nullification, I think that it
is a fascinating topic. I have done a little bit of research myself,
and my recollection is that only New Hampshire actually
recognizes the right of a litigant to a nullification instruction
from the judge.5 Maryland, as it turns out, is very often
misidentified as a nullification state. This arises from the
presence in Maryland's state Constitution of language
4 I served on the Baltimore City Circuit Court from December 1990 through
August 1995.
See New Hampshire v. Bonacorsi, 648 A.2d 469, 471 (N.H. 1994) ("[I]t is
within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine if the facts of a particular
case warrant a jury nullification instruction when it has been requested by a party.");
see also New Hampshire v. Preston, 442 A.2d 992, 996 (N.H. 1982) (holding that the
trial judge did not err when charging the jury that they could act on their
.conscientious feeling about what is a fair result in this case" because " 'Ijiury
nullification is an historical prerogative of the jury.' " (quoting New Hampshire v.
Weitzman, 427 A.2d 3, 7 (N.H. 1981) (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972))),
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referring to juries as the judges of the law and of the facts.'
Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals' effectively eliminated
that provision from its state Constitution some years ago.8
I confess unabashedly to have absolute reverence for
juries. After ten years of jury trials as a state and now federal
judge, and after many years before that of trying jury cases, I
still get choked up when I turn to the jury in criminal and civil
cases and ask the foreperson to deliver the verdict. I get choked
up most of all in those cases brought by state prisoners under
42 U.S.C. § 19839 for Eighth Amendment violations. Few such
cases actually survive summary judgment, but when they do, I
always try them. Furthermore, I will not send them to a
magistrate judge because I absolutely feel that such cases are
what our country is all about: the voice of the community
speaking to the least powerful among us after a process that is
imbued with, in my judgment, a reverence. Certainly, as long
as I am a judge, as long as I am a member of the Bar, and as
long as those of us who care deeply about our system are in a
position to do anything about it, I will work in appropriate
ways to resist efforts to take away from juries the decision
making in civil and criminal cases.
Finally, what sometimes gets lost in our system of
justice is what to me is the profound truth: that the judge in
our system is actually the servant of the juror. Currently, there
are many criticisms of our system, and in particular, of jurors
coming from certain quarters. Additionally, some people view
the gatekeeper role of the judge as illegitimate, as infringing on
jury prerogatives.
G MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. XXIII ("In the trial of all criminal
cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law as well as of facts, except that the Court
may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction."). Georgia and
Indiana are the only other states with similar rules. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XI
("IT]he jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("In
all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts.").
7 Similar to New York's highest court, Maryland's highest Court is called the
Court of Appeals.
8 See King v. Maryland, 414 A.2d 909, 912-13 (1980) (holding that a juror
who disapproved of a law could not automatically be excluded, but that if a juror's
disapproval of a law would affect her deliberations or verdict, she could be struck for
cause).
, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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As an example of these issues, I direct your attention
to the fascinating case of Logerquist v. McVey'* that was
recently decided in Arizona. In that case, the Arizona Supreme
Court, when confronted with "repressed memory syndrome"
evidence, held that neither Frye v. United States" nor Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 would apply to the
assessment of the admissibility of such evidence." The court
held that if the witness who wished to offer such expert
evidence had the appropriate credentials" then Arizona would
leave it up to the jury to decide what weight, if any, to give
such testimony."
I would not go that far. The judge, as the servant of
the jury, has a role to play in serving a screening function, and
certainly in the area of scientific evidence there is a legitimate
role for the judicial officer to make the jury's job "easier," more
manageable, and more rational.
Ultimately, jurors work hard to achieve the correct
result for the correct reason. In doing so, it has been my
experience that they take their lead from the judge in many
different ways. The judge sets the tone in the courtroom. The
judge, notwithstanding the justifiable criticism about jury
instructions," can work hard to make jury instructions more
understandable and functional to juries. In fact, judges have an
obligation to do that.
But as a judge, I would not want to work in a system
that lacked appellate courts, and I would not want to work in a
system where jury nullification was not available. I do not
think jury nullification is a right. Case law in the federal
system certainly makes it clear that there is no right to jury
10 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
1 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13 Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 131.
14 The witness, who was educated at Harvard University, certainly did have
appropriate credentials.
is Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 131.
16 See generally Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on
Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; And Mitigation is No
Excuse, 66 BROOK L. REV. 1011 (2001); Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification:
Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1209 (2001); Peter Tiersma,
The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1083 (2001); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and
Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK L. REV. 1123 (2001).
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nullification.17 But a properly handled trial will allow sufficient
flexibility so that the long nullification tradition, so important
to our democracy, can be given sway in an appropriate case.
I will close with a quotation from a D.C. Circuit
unpublished opinion that I thought was rather remarkable,
although it is one of those back-handed ways in which we in
the judiciary recognize the legitimacy of jury nullification. This
opinion involved a claim in a criminal appeal that the defense
lawyer had performed inadequately and perhaps violated the
standard of Strickland v. Washington"8 for adequate
representation of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. A panel
comprised of Judges Doug Ginsberg, Patricia Wald, and Dave
Tatel on the D.C. Circuit wrote: "It may be possible for a
defense lawyer to satisfy the Strickland standard while using a
defense with little or no basis in law if this constitutes a
reasonable strategy of seeking jury nullification."
That statement was a remarkable, almost unconscious
recognition of the legitimate role in our legal scheme for jury
nullification that, of course, comes with any number of
different meanings." Although I do not want too much of it, I
am happy nullification exists.
'7 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(describing the history of jury nullification in the United States and holding that even
though nullification exists, nullification instructions to juries would run the risk of
"degrading the legal structure requisite for true freedom, for an ordered liberty that
protects against anarchy as well as tyranny").466 U.S. 668, 695-97 (1984).
See generally Irwin A. Horowitz et al., supra note 16.
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